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Democracy on a Shoestring 
Joshua S. Sellers* 
Roger Michalski** 
Democracy requires money. Voters must be registered, voting rolls 
updated, election dates advertised, voting technology purchased and tested, poll 
workers trained, ballots designed, votes counted and verified, and on and on. 
Despite the importance of election expenditures, we have a shamefully 
inadequate amount of information about how much our elections cost. This 
Article, based on a novel and painstakingly hand-coded dataset, provides much 
needed information on election expenditures across multiple years from four 
states: California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida. These states, given their unique 
characteristics, provide a compelling sample set.  
In what we believe to be a completely novel approach to the collection of 
election expenditure data, we supplement our hand-coded data with predictive 
machine learning. This allows us to estimate average annual election spending 
across multiple government units. Our findings, unsurprisingly, reveal great 
variation both across and within states. But our findings also reveal that much 
of the variation is seemingly unconnected to poverty, race, and other traditional 
explanations of electoral disadvantage. This brings into question many basic 
assumptions legislators, courts, and scholars harbor about election 
expenditures. Our findings implicate not only policy discussions about election 
funding but also the limitations of doctrinal interventions and judicial remedies 
that are divorced from issues of resource allocation.  
The Article proceeds in five parts: Part I provides background on 
election funding, including a discussion of election costs and what the most 
common funding sources are. This Part also discusses election law doctrines 
and how they do not directly consider election expenditures. Part II outlines our 
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data and methods. Part III presents our main findings. Part IV responds to the 
findings and explores potential doctrines under which election expenditures 
might be considered. Part V weighs the pros and cons of several nondoctrinal 
proposals for election administration reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2017, Representative Blake Farenthold, a member 
of Congress from Texas’s Gulf Coast, announced that he would not be 
seeking reelection.1 His announcement followed public allegations 
made by, among others, two former press secretaries that he “had an 
 
 1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Blake Farenthold, Texas Congressman Accused of Sexual 
Harassment, Will Not Run Again, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/ 
14/us/politics/blake-farenthold-texas-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/9N7H-Y222]. 
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explosive temper, berated them repeatedly, made sexually explicit jokes 
and engaged in casual sexual banter that set a tone followed by his 
underlings.”2 He ultimately resigned in April 2018.3 In the wake of 
Farenthold’s resignation, Texas governor Greg Abbott called for a 
special election to replace him, despite the fact that his successor would 
potentially serve only a few months.4 The special election was strongly 
opposed by county officials who were forced to use emergency funds to 
cover the costs.5 “This election is costing us what we don’t have,” said 
one county official.6               
The episode highlights a simple truth: democracy requires 
money. Voters must be registered, voting rolls updated, election dates 
advertised, voting technology purchased and tested, poll workers 
trained, ballots designed, votes counted and verified, and on and on. All 
of this can be done well or poorly. Regrettably, “[n]o one knows how 
much it costs to run elections in the United States.”7 
While keen observers of the electoral terrain warn of election 
“meltdowns”8 and “emergencies”9 that threaten our electoral process, 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Farenthold Resigns from Congress, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/06/ 
farenthold-resigns-from-congress-507059 (last updated Apr. 6, 2018, 5:40 PM) [https://perma.cc/ 
72MB-ZU9V]. 
 4. Patrick Svitek, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Schedules June 30 Special Election to Fill U.S. 
Rep. Blake Farenthold’s Seat, TEX. TRIB., https://www.texastribune.org/2018/04/24/texas-greg-
abbott-special-election-blake-farenthold-june-30 (last updated Apr. 24, 2018, 4:00 PM) 
[https://perma.cc/45LW-95SQ]. 
 5. Didi Martinez, Texas Officials Rage Against ‘Crazy’ Farenthold Election, POLITICO (June 
26, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/26/blake-farenthold-election-texas-
674865 [https://perma.cc/P7L6-FCSN] (“County officials say expenses associated with a special 
election are forcing them to reach into their contingency funds – accounts set up to cover 
government emergencies – or significantly downsize their operations.”).  
 6. Id. (quoting Caldwell County Elections Administrator Pam Ohlendorf).  
 7. Katy Owens Hubler & Wendy Underhill, Election Costs: Who Pays and with Which 
Funds?, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
elections-and-campaigns/election-costs-who-pays-and-with-which-funds.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
BGP4-TSK4]; see Zachary Mohr, Martha Kropf, JoEllen Pope, Mary Joe Shepherd & Madison 
Esterle, Election Administration Spending in Local Election Jurisdictions: Results from a 
Nationwide Data Collection Project 2 (July 26–27, 2018) (unpublished paper from 2018 Election 
Sciences, Reform, and Administration Conference), https://esra.wisc.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/1556/2020/11/mohr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLM6-XHVB] (“While U.S. policymakers 
have provided for more centralized data concerning voter turnout, provisional votes and registered 
voters, no scholars that we know of have unearthed cost data in a systematic way nationwide.”).  
 8. See RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION MELTDOWN: DIRTY TRICKS, DISTRUST, AND THE THREAT 
TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2020); RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO 
THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012). 
 9. Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and 
Terrorist Attacks, 67 EMORY L.J. 545, 547 (2018) (“Most state election codes do not contain 
provisions that specifically attempt to mitigate the impact of public health crises, extreme weather 
events, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other calamities (collectively, ‘emergencies’) on the 
electoral process.”). 
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often elided is the more consequential yet prosaic issue of election 
funding. State and local election officials cite insufficient resources as 
their chief concern.10 Whether seeking to update voter registration 
databases, overhaul election security programs in response to Russian 
interference in the 2016 election,11 or alter voting procedures in light of 
COVID-19,12 state and local governments need financial support. And 
the support they are currently receiving is inadequate.13 Election 
officials are, according to Michigan director of elections Christopher 
Thomas, “at the bottom of the food chain when it comes to  
resources.”14 This alone is disconcerting and justifies an auditing of 
election spending.15 
Given our lack of spending data, it is difficult to know which 
reforms are sensible. For instance, data revealing intrastate spending 
disparities might indicate that resources are being ineffectively 
distributed. Ideally, within each state, all voters will receive roughly 
the same level of voting-related services. Yet we know, anecdotally, that 
counties, which generally run elections in the United States, differ 
markedly in their election system performance. Relatedly, we simply do 
not know how intercounty spending disparities relate to other 
variables, like county size and county demographics. The absence of this 
information further complicates reform prospects. For these reasons, 
 
 10. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION 
ADMINISTRATION 10 (2014), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/ 
publication/466754/doc/slspublic/Amer%20Voting%20Exper-final%20draft%2001-04-14-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JP6V-SMM2] (“The most universal complaint of election administrators in 
testimony before the Commission concerned a lack of resources.”). 
 11. See NAT’L INTEL. COUNCIL, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT 
US ELECTIONS (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
94S2-BCHH]  (detailing Russian interference). 
 12. Alexa Corse & Dustin Volz, States Explore More Vote-By-Mail Options to Cope with 
Coronavirus, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-explore-more-vote-by-mail-options-
to-cope-with-coronavirus-11585306800 (last updated Mar. 27, 2020, 2:19 PM) [https://perma.cc/ 
RY4J-8SQD]. 
 13. See CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, LIZ HOWARD, PAUL ROSENZWEIG, DAVID SALVO & RACHAEL 
DEAN WILSON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DEFUNDING ELECTIONS: FEDERAL FUNDING NEEDS FOR 
STATE ELECTION SECURITY (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/ 
Report_Defending_Elections.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT6N-V849] (making the case for additional 
federal grant funds based on a six-state analysis). 
 14. Pat Beall, Catharina Felke & Elizabeth Mulvey, As Trump and Biden Battle, Election 
Officials Are Running Out of Time, Money for November, PBS (July 14, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/frontline/article/covid-voting-mail-in-ballots-election-officials-running-out-of-time-money-
for-november/?sf125413278=1 [https://perma.cc/RH25-5Y3C]. 
 15. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Measuring Election System Performance, 
13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 449 (2010) (“For example, there exists no census of election 
administration to collect reliable and comprehensive data, including (1) the number of elections 
run each year, (2) the resources of election offices (staffing and budgets), (3) the backgrounds and 
political orientations of election officers, and (4) the number of poll workers.”). 
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based on a novel and painstakingly hand-coded dataset, this Article 
provides much needed information on election expenditures from four 
states: California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida. These states, given their 
unique characteristics,16 provide a compelling sample set.17    
Unsurprisingly, we find that election expenditures vary 
significantly both across and within states and that, in many 
communities, spending is frugal. But our findings also reveal that much 
of the variation is seemingly unconnected to poverty, race, and other 
traditional explanations of electoral disadvantage. For instance, some 
rich counties spend less on elections than their poor neighbors; some 
large counties spend less than small counties. Election spending in 
majority-minority communities seems largely indistinguishable from 
spending in predominantly white communities. In short, basic 
assumptions one might have about resource allocation are brought  
into question.  
To be sure, data on election expenditures can only tell us so 
much, and many questions remain unanswered.18 What is the precise 
relationship between election spending and election quality? Why do we 
tend to see poorer election administration in big cities? Why, given what 
we know about the inadequacy of election services in many minority 
communities, are those inadequacies not revealed by data on election 
spending? These are immensely important questions that exceed the 
scope of what follows. But our findings, which are based on both public 
documents and responses we received from county and subcounty 
officials, nevertheless have important doctrinal and normative 
 
 16. Among other features, the states differ in size, demographic profile, governance structure, 
and political orientation. See infra Section II.A. 
 17. We are aware of only one other team of researchers that is attempting to measure election 
expenditures on as large a scale, though their findings remain unpublished. A group of social 
scientists, based out of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and funded by the MIT 
Election Data and Science Lab, are engaged in a nationwide data collection project that attempts 
to gather information that is similar to ours. See Mohr et al., supra note 7. Our project, however, 
differs in important ways. Simply stated, our project examines election expenditures in 
combination with overall budget numbers (from the Census Annual Survey of State and Local 
Government Finances) and with demographic data (from the American Community Survey). We 
also include multi-tier overlapping government expenditures (through geographic matchups). 
Moreover, given our legal training, our project evaluates how this fiscal data might inform election 
law doctrines. Finally, our data is more recent, includes findings from different jurisdictions, and, 
as detailed below, is collected in part by predictive machine learning. In short, this Article presents 
novel empirical findings and draws important doctrinal implications unlikely to be  
replicated elsewhere. 
 18. One such question is how to account for varying funding source origins. See Mohr et al., 
supra note 7, at 16 (“Some states may pay for election equipment, equipment maintenance, and 
training. Cost accounting may be needed to standardize the costs of election administration so  
that the expenditures that are being observed, most often at the local level, are apples to  
apples comparisons.”). 
            
1084 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1079 
implications pertaining to each of these questions and provide a 
foundation on which future research can build.  
First, just the variation itself in election expenditures from place 
to place should give us pause, even if it is easily explainable. Even in a 
world without bad faith, political meddling, or questionable motives, it 
is difficult to run elections well without sufficient financial backing. 
Overworked, undertrained, poorly supported election staff are less 
likely than their well-resourced counterparts to administer elections in 
an optimally inclusive and secure manner. Perhaps more money, and 
more equalizing money, can help fix many election law-related issues. 
As such, we propose that states utilize funding-redistribution measures 
to establish a minimal, or adequate, level of election services. A voter in 
a poor part of the rural Texas Panhandle should receive the same 
minimally acceptable level of election services as a rich voter in an 
urban technology hub, even if certain differences are justified.  
Second, our findings highlight the limitations of doctrinal 
interventions and judicial remedies that are divorced from issues of 
resource allocation. The animating impulse of many election law 
doctrines is participation—the ability to participate in politics on equal 
terms with others. The bulk of contemporary litigation is over voting 
rights for individuals and groups that allege they are being unjustly 
burdened in their ability to meaningfully take part in a fair political 
process. Given this fact, it is odd that election expenditures are rarely 
a central aspect of litigation. We discuss this discordance between 
“doctrine and dollars” below.  
The Article proceeds in five parts: Part I provides background on 
election funding, including a discussion of election costs and what the 
most common funding sources are. This Part also discusses election law 
doctrines and how they do not directly consider election expenditures. 
Part II outlines our data and methods. In addition to the reported 
findings, the Article uses predictive machine learning to supplement 
remaining gaps in the research. Part III includes our main findings. 
Part IV responds to the findings and explores potential doctrines under 
which election expenditures might be considered. Part V weighs the 
pros and cons of several nondoctrinal proposals for election 
administration reform.  
I. THE PRICE OF ELECTIONS 
Given the vast heterogeneity of government units across the 
country, a degree of modesty is in order when making claims about the 
price of elections. In some locations, elections are well-funded and occur 
without incident. In others, as described in the Introduction, a single 
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election can cause financial distress. At times, federal funding 
supplements state and local expenditures, though such funding is 
typically quite limited and sporadic.19 More commonly, state and local 
governments are required to finance elections on their own. This Part 
provides background on election funding, including what the most 
common funding sources are. It also discusses election law doctrines 
and how they do not directly consider election expenditures.  
A. Election Costs 
To call the American electoral system decentralized risks 
understatement. State and local governments are in charge of 
administering elections and, accordingly, have to pay for election 
administration.20 Local governments, in particular, “manage voter 
registration systems, vote tabulation systems, absentee ballots, vote 
reports, and the precincts, polling stations, and legions of poll workers 
necessary to carry out an election.”21 Some of the costs associated with 
these responsibilities are minimal. For instance, reserving a local 
gymnasium for use as a polling site is not a great expense. Similarly, 
the costs associated with training local election officials is not likely to 
be great. Constant experimentation also leads to cost savings. For 
example, Los Angeles County replaced thousands of its polling sites 
 
 19. See, e.g., DELUZIO ET AL., supra note 13, at 1:  
Critically, in 2018 Congress provided $380 million in Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 
grant funds to help states bolster their election security. Grant recipient states had to 
submit a grant narrative—a list of specific election security projects (and estimated 
costs) that the state planned to fund with grant money—and provide a 5 percent state 
match within two years; 
Matthew M. Damschroder, Of Money, Machines, and Management: Election Administration from 
an Administrator’s Perspective, 12 ELECTION L.J. 195, 195 (2013) (describing the “five main 
outcomes” of the Help America Vote Act); Miles Parks, Congress Allocates $425 Million for Election 
Security in New Legislation, NPR (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/12/16/788490509/congress-allocates-425-million-for-election-security-in-new-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/XS43-PN2S] (“Although Congress has agreed to support elections infrastructure 
around the nation, it does so in large, unpredictable chunks as opposed to predictable year-over-
year appropriations — which many election officials would prefer.”). Four-hundred million dollars 
in election security grants were included in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
Act, Covid-19 Stimulus Bill: What It Means for States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 
2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/coronavirus-stimulus-bill-
states.aspx [https://perma.cc/DZU4-KUHW], a sum that many believe to be woefully inadequate. 
See, e.g., Martin Matishak, Think Tank Estimates $2 Billion Cost to Carry Out November Election 
During Pandemic, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020),  https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/2020-
election-cost-coronavirus-138232 [https://perma.cc/EMC2-W6ZR]. 
 20. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 778 (2016) 
(“The degree and kind of decentralization varies by state, but nearly all aspects of election 
administration are delegated to local governments by at least some set of states.”).  
 21. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 15, at 448. 
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with vote centers.22 The move was designed to provide greater 
convenience by permitting voting at any vote center in the county over 
an eleven-day period. Beyond simple convenience, though, vote centers 
are also cost-effective.23 In short, whether through state appropriations 
or local bond measures, certain costs are both predictable and bearable. 
Other costs, though, are much more burdensome. Running a 
primary election is often quite expensive.24 California’s 2012 decision to 
hold only one, rather than two, primary elections reportedly “saved the 
California state budget approximately $100 million.”25 Technological 
upgrades, including new voting machines and related security 
measures, can also be remarkably costly.26 For example, Arizona 
election officials claim that they “do not currently have funds they need 
to expand cybersecurity assistance to local election officials or replace 
legacy voting systems.”27 Colorado’s secretary of state has raised similar 
concerns about the cost of cybersecurity protections.28 Even assuming 
cybersecurity protections can be bought and installed, information 
technology specialists are necessary to monitor system performance.29 
 
 22. Matt Stiles & Ryan Menezes, Now You Can Vote Anywhere in L.A. County. Find a 
Location, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-county-vote-center-
locations [https://perma.cc/2GGD-SM6J]; Austin Cross, Enjoy Your Local Polling Place While You 
Can. It Probably Won’t Last, LAIST (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://laist.com/2018/10/30/ 
los_angeles_local_polling_place_voting_centers.php [https://perma.cc/MP9E-ENS6]; see also 
David McClendon, Top 5 Takeaways About the Vote Your Way Campaign, JANUARYADVISORS (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://www.januaryadvisors.com/vote-your-way-top-5-takeaways [https://perma.cc/ 
QE3B-L9J3] (reviewing a voting campaign from Harris County, Texas, that allowed voters to vote 
at any polling location, not just the one assigned to their precinct). 
 23. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY: SPLITTING THE BILL 
FOR ELECTIONS 25 (2018), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Final_Costs_ 
Report-Splitting_the_Bill_for_Elections_32084.pdf [https://perma.cc/A58Z-H8LX] (“Having vote 
centers reduces a jurisdiction’s need for precinct polling places. Fewer polling places means fewer 
poll workers are needed, as well as potentially fewer supplies and rental costs for polling place 
locations, all of which can save a jurisdiction money.”).  
 24. See BARBARA NORRANDER, THE IMPERFECT PRIMARY: ODDITIES, BIASES, AND STRENGTHS 
OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS 138 (3d ed. 2019) (“In several recent election years, 
a handful of states canceled their presidential primaries in [the] face of state budget shortfalls.”). 
 25. Id. at 143. 
 26. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 23, at 2 (“While elections technology 
costs are just one part of the overall costs of elections, they are the driving cost in policy 
conversations, at least at the legislative level. That’s because most states are looking to replace 
their equipment before the 2020 presidential election.”).  
 27. DELUZIO ET AL., supra note 13, at 4. 
 28. Michael Wines, $250 Million to Keep Votes Safe? Experts Say Billions Are Needed, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/us/mitch-mcconnell-election-security-bill-.html (last 
updated Sept. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3H3F-EHM3]. 
 29. See Damschroder, supra note 19, at 198 (“Ten years since the promise of an IT revolution 
in election administration was kick-started by [the Help America Vote Act], election 
administrators—and the local government officials who must now foot most of the bill to keep it 
all going—are wondering whether the ongoing price tag is worth it.”). 
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This requires hiring election officials or specialists with the requisite 
technological skills. 
Outside of elections, funds are needed simply to maintain 
registration databases. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”)30 
requires states to maintain centralized voter registration databases. 
Among other things, this requires coordinating with local 
governments,31 providing a means of accepting and processing 
registrations from individuals and organizations that register new 
voters, and empowering state agencies to register new voters when 
individuals utilize their services.32 These bureaucratic obligations are 
not without cost.33 In sum, elections involve both fixed and variable 
costs for which state and local governments must budget.          
B. Who Pays?  
So, where does the money come from? The National Conference 
of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) reports that most costs are still borne by 
counties and local governments, but, over time, states have increased 
their financial support.34 Nearly all states, with the sole exception of 
North Dakota, maintain statewide voter registration lists that are paid 
for with state funds.35 States typically also pay for elections, though the 
 
 30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145).  
 31. See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 23, at 17 (“[I]n Texas, 215 of 
the 254 counties directly use the Texas statewide voter registration system to manage their data, 
and another 39 counties manage their own voter registration data and exchange data with the 
statewide database every night.”); Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1102 (2018) (“Because California’s elections system is highly decentralized—
voter registration happens at the local level—and because local public assistance and DMV offices 
collect the voter registration forms, those local agencies must coordinate with local registrars’ 
offices to deliver the forms.”).  
 32. The latter is an obligation required by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. See 
52 U.S.C. § 20504 (requiring motor vehicle offices to register voters); 52 U.S.C. § 20506 (requiring 
public assistance offices and disability services offices to register voters).  
 33. See Mohr et al., supra note 7, at 25: 
The cost of an election is simply the cost of the personnel, equipment, and supplies 
needed to conduct an election during the relatively brief period of time when people are 
voting. The cost of elections is the cost of all election administration that includes the 
cost of the election and the additional costs of maintaining and securing the voter 
registration database, updating it with DMV and military records, updating, testing, 
and securing the voting equipment, and training election officials throughout the year. 
In sum, the cost of elections is greater than the cost of an election. 
(emphasis added). 
 34. See Election Costs: What States Pay, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-costs.aspx#SVRS 
[https://perma.cc/DXL4-RC9C] (“A series of federal laws in the last 50 years have had the impact 
of putting more of the responsibility (and therefore the cost) of elections on states, rather than 
local jurisdictions.”). 
 35. Id. 
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details of how much and for which types of elections vary greatly. For 
example, in Delaware, the state Department of Elections pays for all 
elections in the state.36 In Alabama, the state covers the entire cost of 
elections involving only federal or state candidates, but only half the 
cost of elections involving federal, state, and county races.37 In 
Michigan, local governments may seek reimbursement for the cost of 
running a presidential primary.38  
State financial support primarily comes from state tax 
revenues.39 Counties—whose budgets are typically comprised of federal 
money, state money, and local property taxes—use their general funds 
to administer elections. Local governments, school districts, and special 
purpose districts also use their general funds to pay for elections and in 
some instances will reimburse counties for the inclusion of local issues 
on a county-produced ballot.40   
The least consistent form of funding comes from the federal 
government. Such funding is infrequent and spotty. In 2019, the 
Congressional Research Service reported that “Congress has authorized 
significant federal funding for state and local election administration in 
one bill: HAVA.”41 HAVA initially provided the means for states to 
upgrade their voting systems.42 It has since been used to improve 
election security, with Congress allocating $380 million to that end in 
early 2018 and an additional $425 million in late 2019.43 More recently, 
Congress included $400 million in election funding in the Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, passed in March 2020.44 These 
are paltry amounts given acknowledged financial needs.45 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Hubler & Underhill, supra note 7 (“For states that do help with election funding, the 
money can come from a direct appropriation. In cases where policy choices increase costs for local 
jurisdictions, such as implementing early voting or enhanced post-election audit procedures, states 
may fund the new mandate.”). 
 40. See, e.g., CAROLYN CHU & NICK SCHROEDER, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., THE 2017-18 
BUDGET: CONSIDERING THE STATE’S ROLE IN ELECTIONS 3 (2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/ 
3634/state-role-elections-033017.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9CQ-TERK]. 
 41. KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 9 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R45549.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSJ2-5LTM]. 
 42. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 20, at 757–59. 
 43. Parks, supra note 19.  
 44. Emily Cochrane & Nicholas Fandos, Senate Approves $2 Trillion Stimulus After 
Bipartisan Deal, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/politics/coronavirus-senate-
deal.html (last updated May 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JR44-C3QK]. 
 45. See generally DELUZIO ET AL., supra note 13 (finding that current federal funding for 
elections is insufficient).  
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C. Doctrine and Dollars                 
Does legal doctrine account for resource disparities? The short 
answer is no. Voters who feel they have been unjustly excluded or 
disadvantaged have several legal theories under which they might seek 
recourse. The most common statutory cause of action is the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”),46 which prohibits both vote denial47 and vote 
dilution48 on account of race or color. Though the doctrine remains 
confused, voters might pursue a cause of action under the First 
Amendment.49 Intentional racial discrimination, though difficult to 
establish, can be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 And 
the framework most commonly applied to election regulations, a form 
of judicial review unique to election law commonly known as Anderson-
Burdick,51 balances burdens on voters against state interests, also 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.52 None of these legal theories 
provides an ideal fit for challenging resource disparities.  
The VRA is aimed at remedying racial discrimination in the 
political process. First Amendment theories of the right to vote turn on 
contested notions about the parameters of speech and association.53 The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on intentional racial 
discrimination is, barring a damning evidentiary record, inapposite. 
 
 46. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (prohibiting states from applying any “standard, practice, or 
procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color”).  
 47. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1011 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) 
(“The results test of Section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] applies in both vote dilution and vote 
denial cases.”); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 
2014) (“Indeed, Section 2’s plain language makes clear that vote denial is precisely the kind of 
issue Section 2 was intended to address.”). 
 48. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (analyzing a vote dilution claim under the VRA). 
 49. See Joshua S. Sellers, Political Participation, Expressive Association, and Judicial 
Review, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1617, 1624–28 (2020); Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is 
Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 472 (2016) (“The First Amendment is a logical locus for 
voting protection for several reasons.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985) (“Proof of racially 
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
492 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)); see also Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1211, 1212, 1220 (2018). 
 51. The shorthand refers to two Supreme Court cases addressing regulations of the electoral 
process. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 52. See Sellers, supra note 49, at 1624–28 (explaining Anderson-Burdick). 
 53. Id. at 1628–35.  
            
1090 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1079 
And Anderson-Burdick, while potentially applicable, has in practice 
provided substantial deference to states.54 
Perhaps this is perfectly tolerable. Perhaps the last thing we 
want is courts second-guessing state and local governments’ spending 
choices. Moreover, disparate resource allocation may in many instances 
be good public policy. There are compelling reasons not to unthinkingly 
equalize election expenditures across all counties: counties vary in size, 
population, and need.55 Further, nothing mandates that elections be 
generously funded. Above a relatively low threshold level of access, one 
could argue, voters have little legal basis to challenge antiquated or 
even inconvenient voting procedures.  
Under this way of thinking, judicial review is appropriately 
limited to circumstances in which the right to vote is severely impeded, 
or in which certain classes of voters are systematically disadvantaged. 
In general, however, election services may very well be poor. Just as we 
lack an affirmative right to vote,56 we lack an affirmative right to a 
smoothly run, convenient election system. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to suspect that election administration problems are related 
to funding. Again, election administrators themselves cite a lack of 
funding as their principal concern. The question remains: Are there  
any doctrinal grounds on which disparate election expenditures might  
be challenged?  
One underdeveloped doctrinal possibility derives from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,57 in which the Court ended 
the recounting of contested ballots in Florida, effectively awarding the 
presidency to George W. Bush.58 For all the controversy over the 
decision, the equal protection holding held promise for voting rights 
advocates.59 In reinforcing the principle that franchise equality extends 
 
 54. Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 554 
(2015); Ellen D. Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from Election Law, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 1615, 1631 (2009).  
 55. Richard L. Hasen, When Is Uniformity of People, Not Counties, Appropriate in Election 
Administration? The Cases of Early and Sunday Voting, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 198; David C. 
Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Election Administration, 
12 ELECTION L.J. 130, 142 (2013) (“Densely populated local jurisdictions are substantially different 
than smaller jurisdictions in many measurable indicators of election administration.”). 
 56. See Jesse Wegman, Why Voting Discrimination Haunts America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/opinion/15th-amendment-voting-anniversary.html 
[https://perma.cc/6FET-W4B4]. 
 57. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).  
 58. For a full accounting of the case, see Edward B. Foley, Bush v. Gore: The Court Stops the 
Recount, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 541 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).  
 59. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) 
(“[T]he opinion could usher in an era when courts would use the equal protection clause as a tool 
to fix some fundamental inequalities in the ‘nuts and bolts’ of our country’s hyper-decentralized 
election administration system.”).  
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to the “manner”60 of voting, and in assailing “arbitrary and disparate 
treatment”61 by the state, the Court indicated support for general 
fairness in the realm of election administration.62 In fact, the Court 
specifically relied on an earlier decision in which it invalidated 
“arbitrary and disparate treatment to voters in its different counties.”63   
To be sure, Bush v. Gore also includes language that cuts against 
a broad equal protection holding.64 And scholars continue to debate its 
relevance.65 But one judicial circuit has relied on the decision to 
invalidate not just intercounty disparities, but a number of laws 
involving the arbitrary treatment of voters.66 A workable litigation 
theory, then, would depend on tethering such arbitrary treatment of 
voters to identifiable resource disparities. We consider the practicality 
of such a theory in Section IV.A.   
A second doctrinal possibility for challenging disparate election 
expenditures, one premised on the notion of electoral adequacy, might 
exist under judicial interpretations of state constitutions. As Josh 
Douglas has noted, “all fifty states provide explicit voting protection for 
their citizens.”67 Further, twenty-six states include language in their 
constitutions ensuring some form of “free” elections.68 And finally, 
Anderson-Burdick provides a third doctrinal basis on which inadequate 
election resources might be challenged. We consider these possibilities 
in Sections IV.B and IV.C. But first, we turn to a discussion of our data, 
methods, and main findings.  
 
 60. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Samuel Issacharoff, Opinion, The Court in the Crossfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/opinion/the-court-in-the-crossfire.html 
[https://perma.cc/D34J-RN4B] (“[The Court] has asserted a new constitutional requirement: to 
avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters.”). 
 63. Bush, 531 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added) (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)).  
 64. Id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of 
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”). 
 65. Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 483 (2019) (“Courts have 
occasionally invoked the equal protection claim in Bush v. Gore when considering election law-
related litigation. I hesitate even to raise Bush v. Gore.”); Hasen, supra note 55, at 193 (“Almost a 
decade and a half since the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Bush v. Gore, no one knows 
what the case’s Equal Protection principle means or if it exists at all.”). 
 66. See generally Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the 
Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013) (summarizing the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on and expansion of Bush v. Gore). 
 67. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89,  
101 (2014).  
 68. Id. at 103 (“As an added level of protection, twenty-six states include a provision in their 
constitutions stating that elections shall be ‘free,’ ‘free and equal,’ or ‘free and open.’ ”).  
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II. DATA AND METHODS 
As a country, we have a shamefully inadequate amount of 
information about how our elections are paid for. Anecdotes, while 
interesting, present a complex picture that simply reinforces the need 
for data. For example, as noted above, Los Angeles County has 
sufficient resources to open additional voting centers and develop a new 
generation of voting machines. But not all local governments are as 
fortunate. A lack of resources potentially affects the quality of 
operations. Consider the hiring of election staffers. The New York Times 
describes the recruitment of poll workers in New York City as “a 
perennial problem,”69 yet efforts to increase poll worker pay above 
fourteen dollars an hour have failed.70 Elections administrators in 
Missoula County, Montana, are paid just $8.65 an hour, less than they 
would be paid down the road at the local Walmart.71 Alas, for job 
applicants, “enthusiasm for democracy is a must!”72  
These examples suggest variation in how much money 
communities spend on election administration. But is such variation 
rare or the norm? To move beyond anecdotes, we collected data on the 
election-related expenditures of multiple tiers of government. Our aim 
was to approximate, as much as possible, how much money is spent in 
different parts of the country. Because so little of this research exists, 
our focus was on overall funding patterns rather than granularity. This 
Part outlines our data and methods.  
A. Local Government Budgets 
Since multiple tiers of government have a hand in funding 
elections, we collected budget data on multiple tiers and combined 
 
 69. Spenser Mestel, The Path to Becoming an Underpaid, Underappreciated and Absolutely 
Necessary Election Poll Worker, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/ 
nyregion/the-path-to-becoming-an-underpaid-underappreciated-and-absolutely-necessary-
election-poll-worker.html [https://perma.cc/74TP-35RE]. 
 70. Id.: 
Every year for the past eight years, the Board of Elections has asked the State Assembly 
to increase compensation for poll workers – this year by paying poll workers $100 for 
the four-hour training and $300 for the roughly 17 hours of work on Election Day. The 
proposal has never passed. 
 71. Peter Christian, Missoula County Looks to Hire 600 Election Judges for 2020, NEWSTALK 
KGVO (Jan. 21, 2020), https://newstalkkgvo.com/missoula-county-looks-to-hire-600-election-
judges-for-2020 [https://perma.cc/SSP7-5QYQ] (“$8.65 is our basic wage for most entry  
level positions.”). 
 72. Election Judge Qualifications & Duties, MISSOULA CNTY., MONT., 
https://www.missoulacounty.us/government/administration/elections-office/election-judge-
information/election-judge-qualifications-duties (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
7EM7-EQ49].  
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them. The data is from four states: California, Arizona, Texas, and 
Florida. These states are in no way a random or representative sample 
of the United States as a whole. They are, however, commonly thought 
to reflect different political realities, represent different approaches to 
governance, have varied histories, and exhibit geographical diversity. 
These four states also capture a sizable share of the national population 
(almost a third). And these four states are frequently in the headlines 
for election-related affairs. As such, we hope to make claims about these 
four states specifically and, with caution, speculate about the likely 
conditions elsewhere.  
Crucial to all subsequent claims is the observation that even in 
just these four states, different tiers of government have varied revenue 
structures, expenses, and governing responsibilities. A county or 
county-equivalent in one part of the country cannot necessarily be 
equated with a county elsewhere just because they share the same 
designation. States have great leeway under the U.S. Constitution to 
structure their relationships with substate governing entities.73 
Therefore, we must be careful about making simplistic comparisons 
between states. 
Our analysis is strongest when we compare similar governing 
entities with neighbors that share similar tasks. Noting that Los 
Angeles spends more (or less) on elections than Houston is less 
informative than comparing counties and cities within the greater Los 
Angeles or Houston metropolitan areas. This is also the reason why our 
data collection was not a random sample of, say, counties in the United 
States. Since different counties across the United States handle 
different kinds and volumes of elections, comparisons within a  
random sample of counties would likely be misleading or present an 
incomplete picture.74  
Our data collection strategy began by utilizing the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Census of Governments to identify counties, county-
equivalents, cities, towns, townships, and villages that might have a 
hand in funding and running elections.75 The Census of Governments 
is administered every five years (in years ending in “2” and “7”). The 
survey is thorough and yields very high response rates from close to 
 
 73. See Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local 
Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1371–74 (2020) (discussing states’ ability to substantively and 
structurally preempt local governing entities).  
 74. We considered collecting data on the number of local elections administered or even the 
number of votes cast, but we simply lack the resources to do this additional data collection. We 
hope future researchers will iterate on our work, perhaps by creating a compelling index measure 
of local election activity.  
 75. Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/ 
go0100.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Z5VW-6MWP]. 
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ninety thousand local government entities, certainly far beyond what 
we could have accomplished.76 The end result, for our purposes, is an 
up-to-date list of the hundreds of county and municipal governments in 
these states.77  
We then utilize this list to research election-related 
expenditures one government entity at a time. At times, this was as 
simple as navigating to, say, a town’s official website and downloading 
PDFs of previous budgets. At other times, we had to email or call local 
government officials to obtain budgets that were otherwise unavailable. 
Again, sometimes this process was simple and quick; sometimes it 
required significant time and patience.78 
Once we obtained the budgets, we had to extract the relevant 
information on election administration expenses. The budgets varied 
tremendously in length, style, digital format, and organization.79 Some 
government entities grouped all their election administration expenses 
together in one clearly labeled place. Others distributed these expenses 
across multiple entries, often hundreds of pages apart, that we then 
added together (e.g., equipment costs in one part of the budget, and 
salaries in another, or voter registration expenses separated from 
operational costs). Because of this variance, we want to stress that the 
data is fuzzy.  
For example, while some budgets list expenditures in great 
detail, down to the last stamp put on a letter, others are vaguer, 
providing only a broad overview of election administration 
expenditures. In some counties there is a shared pool of office stationery 
that election administrators use but that does not appear in their 
individual budget. In other places, such expenses are separately listed. 
This variance creates room for interpretation. All our findings must be 
read with this cautionary note in mind.80 But election work is 
 
 76. Id. We are mindful of the possibility of new local governments being chartered during the 
timespan that we studied, or of local governments dissolving or merging. Neither event, however, 
is common in the four states that we studied and, in general, occurs with local government units 
that are not populous.  
 77. The Census Bureau also conducts an Annual Survey of Governments that includes 
tremendously useful information on government finances. That survey, however, is unfortunately 
not granular enough for election-related activities. See Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police 
Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 288–89 (2020) (discussing the Annual Survey of Governments, its 
methodology, and the data it collects). 
 78. Many thanks, again, to our wonderful research assistants who dedicated themselves to 
this task with uncommon diligence. Many thanks also to the numerous local government officials 
who generously helped us.  
 79. This variation ruled out, for our purposes, automated web scrapping, parsing, and the 
like. Some of the budgets are not machine readable. Not even the search function works on  
these documents. 
 80. In a few instances this made data collection impossible. For example, in the City of 
Wichita Falls, Texas, the city clerk is responsible for a variety of tasks, including maintaining legal 
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sufficiently important and distinct such that it is often treated as a 
separate and clearly labelled budget line item. This gives us confidence 
that the core of what we capture in the budgets is stable across 
jurisdictions. Again, this argument is strongest when comparing 
neighbors in the same state and weakest when comparing across states. 
Having collected election administration expenses from one 
jurisdiction for one year, we then repeated this process for multiple 
years for each government entity. Collecting data on only one year 
would have greatly sped up the process and allowed for a broader 
geographic scope. But we believe multiyear collection was necessary to 
account for uneven expenditures across years. A town or county might 
report unrepresentatively high election administration expenditures in 
one year for idiosyncratic reasons. Perhaps there was an unusual string 
of special elections that year, or perhaps the county election 
administration building burned down and needed to be replaced.81 Such 
possibilities are very difficult to observe and include as control 
variables, thus, collecting data on a single year might have 
problematically skewed the analysis. Idiosyncratic events happen, 
though, and must be acknowledged. Our approach takes this reality 
into account by utilizing the mean inflation-adjusted election 
administration expenditures in each jurisdiction across seven years, 
ending in 2017 (we started collecting data in 2018).82   
An additional reason to collect budget expenditures from 
multiple years is that budget years are not uniform. Some local 
governments close their budgets in May and some in October. 
Consequently, it becomes difficult to compare expenditures in a single 
budget year. For example, a “2016” budget that closes in October of 2016 
might contain significant expenditures related to the presidential 
election that year, but no expenditures of the election itself. It would be 
difficult to meaningfully compare such a budget with one that closes 
one month later (even closer to the election) or two months later (right 
after the election). As such, a multiyear approach also helps ensure that 
 
files on all contracts, “maintaining ownership records on all City cemeteries,” and “managing and 
conducting all City elections.” The budget contains information on the city clerk’s office but does 
not separate out with sufficient clarity all election expenditures. Annual Operating Budget for 
Fiscal Year 2017-18, CITY OF WICHITA FALLS, TEX. 403–06 (Oct. 1, 2017), 
http://www.wichitafallstx.gov/DocumentCenter/View/30021/Final-Adopted-Budget-2017-2018 
[https://perma.cc/LX8T-59KS]. 
 81. Similarly, expensive voting equipment purchases are sometimes concentrated in one year 
and sometimes spread out over multiple years. 
 82. The reality is that for some jurisdictions we have data for seven years, but for others we 
have data for fewer years. Some counties make only the last few years of budgets readily available. 
Also, whenever possible we collected data on actual expenditures rather than budgeted 
expenditures. Often these two numbers are closely aligned, but some government entities 
systematically overbudget.  
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variation in budget closing dates does not overshadow what we are 
trying to measure.  
For these reasons, we flatten the time-series data we collected 
for these jurisdictions into a single inflation-adjusted mean.83 This 
approach implies that we, in a way, lose a tremendous amount of 
information: we report only one data point per government unit rather 
than seven. We thought this was necessary, however, to make that one 
data point strong and reliable. Our time span allows us to smooth 
expenditures across time and present a better measure of “typical” 
expenditures. Of course, data on more years would always be better, but 
we believe seven years of data represents a reasonable compromise 
between feasibility and accuracy. The seven-year time span includes 
multiple types of elections (local, state, congressional, and presidential) 
as well as various forms of direct democracy like referendums, 
initiatives, and recalls.  
B. Composite Estimates of Election Expenditures 
Next, we bifurcated our analysis. For some of the figures in the 
following sections we focus on single government entities (e.g., 
counties). In those figures, we simply report the budget numbers we 
collected. By contrast, in other parts of the analysis we seek to provide 
a sense of how much money multiple government entities are spending 
on election administration in a specific location. As such, some of the 
analysis below utilizes composite estimates of election administration 
expenditures. Many voters are almost certainly oblivious to the 
distinction. Most voters do not know, and many perhaps do not care, 
who pays for the election services that they receive.84 But they are 
keenly aware when operations are well run and when they are not. For 
instance, a voter in a town might receive election services from that 
town, the county, the state, and, to a much smaller degree, the federal 
government. And the voting experience might be affected by which 
entity is footing the bill. To account for this, we aggregated and 
disaggregated the election administration expenditure means from the 
previous step of the analysis into small geographic units. 
 
 83. While we adjusted for inflation (which was relatively low during the observed timespan), 
we did not adjust for cost of living. Other researchers might want to incorporate such a measure. 
We did not do so here because significant election expenditures are invariable (e.g., voting 
equipment costing the same, whether purchased by a county with a low or high cost of living).  
 84. As noted, many policymakers are similarly uninformed. Martha Kropf & JoEllen V. Pope, 
Election Costs: A Study of North Carolina, in THE FUTURE OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 185, 185 
(Mitchell Brown, Kathleen Hale & Bridgett A. King eds., 2020) (noting that the amount that state 
and local governments spend on elections “remains a mystery to scholars and policymakers”).  
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The unit of analysis that we chose was U.S. census tracts 
(“tracts” or “census tracts”). We chose tracts because they are fairly 
small, reasonably permanent,85 and often socially meaningful 
statistical subgroups of a county.86 Tract populations typically range 
from slightly above a thousand individuals to eight thousand 
individuals, but most contain around four thousand individuals.87 Each 
county contains at least one census tract. We used geometric 
intersection algorithms to proportionally disaggregate county election 
administration expenditures according to the population of the 
constitutive census tracts in each county.88 For towns, townships, 
villages, and cities, we aggregated expenditures if subcounty 
governments were smaller than census tracts and disaggregated if they 
contained multiple census tracts.  
We then created per capita expenditure measures for 
government units and census tracts.89 We combined these measures 
with demographic and economic data from the American Community 
Survey (“ACS”). The ACS is continuously administered by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. Every year, more than three million households across 
the United States receive ACS forms.90 The responses present an 
 
 85. Census tracts are typically adjusted for the decennial census that is administered in years 
ending in “0.” Since our data collection does not span across multiple decennial censuses, the tracts 
remained largely the same (the Census Bureau at times allows for small boundary adjustments 
between decennial censuses, but this had likely little or no effect on our findings in this Article).  
 86. Census tracts are comprised of block groups that are, in turn, comprised of blocks. 
Because our data is not sufficiently granular, we decided not to use block groups or blocks as our 
primary unit of analysis. Conversely, the census also tracks other geographies that might be of 
interest to other researchers, most notably federal congressional districts. But because our work 
here focuses on all election administration work, not only work related to federal elections, we 
utilize a more granular unit of analysis. Also, federal congressional district boundaries do not 
necessarily correspond to local government boundaries. See generally Glossary, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/glossary (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9WTY-
NG6R] (user can manually search for census terms). 
 87. United States Census Information @ Pitt: Understanding Census Geography, UNIV. OF 
PITTSBURGH LIBR. SYS., https://pitt.libguides.com/uscensus/understandinggeography#:~:text= 
Census%20tracts%20generally%20contain%20between,follow%20relatively%20permanent%20vi
sible%20features (last updated Aug. 28, 2020, 12:33 PM) [https://perma.cc/J3RG-MZU4]. The 
Census Bureau combines tracts when one of them gets close to the one thousand population mark. 
Conversely, it splits tracts when they get close to eight thousand. See id. (“Census tracts generally 
contain between 1,000 and 8,000 people with an optimum size of 4,000 people.”). 
 88. To do this, we matched our data and census data with geographic data that identified the 
physical shape of each census tract, county, and municipality. Each of these units can be 
represented as a polygon on a given projection of the globe. Once we treat these units as polygons, 
we can then check for overlapping polygonal geometries (contain, equals, disjoint, within, touch, 
covers, etc.). 
 89. Keeping in mind that populations changed over the timespan we studied.  
 90. The Importance of the American Community Survey and the 2020 Census, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about/acs-and-census.html (last updated 
Oct. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/S3H7-8GXS]. A sample form can be found online. See 2020 ACS 
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points in the analysis below. Many figures will present findings based 
on collected data alone, while other present both combined and inferred 
data. Cautious and skeptical readers should disregard the 
supplemented data and focus only on findings based on collected data.  
We tested the supplementation of our hand-collected data using 
a variety of supervised machine learning approaches.93 We explored k-
nearest neighbors classification algorithms, random forests models, 
regression models, and deep learning networks. For each model, we 
trained our algorithm with input examples from our hand-coded 
dataset that indicate the desired output (mean annual inflation-
adjusted per capita election administration expenditures). We then 
evaluated which approach yielded the most reliable responses, given 
the structure of our data.  
We found that multiple models performed nearly identically. 
Some were more accurate in one state but lagged a bit in others. Some 
performed marginally better for counties than municipalities. In the 
end, we decided to stack the four highest-performing models to derive 
robust and resilient estimates. We utilize the stacked predicted  
values of these models in all our subsequent figures that include 
inferred estimates. 
D. Limitations and Strengths 
We want to emphasize some of the limitations of our approach. 
The first is that it only yields an estimate, one embedded with 
numerous assumptions.94 The second important limitation is that we 
collected substate data only from counties, cities, towns, townships, and 
villages, but did not collect data on special purpose districts. Insofar as 
such districts independently raise revenue that is then spent on election 
administration tasks, this could skew our analysis. We 
impressionistically found that many special districts, to the extent they 
perform election administrative tasks, do so through 
intragovernmental payments either to or from other substate 
government units.  
Despite these limitations, our hand-coding of hundreds of 
budgets, coupled with the predictive machine learning, creates our best 
estimate of local election administration expenditures.95 To our 
 
 93. To account for local variation, we repeated this process for each state and kept all training 
model and prediction data separate. In other words, predictions for, say, a town in Texas derive 
solely from observed data from Texas rather than any other state.  
 94. We would be thrilled if future researchers improved and iterated on our approach.  
 95. To be more precise: this approach creates our best estimate of the aggregate mean annual 
local per capita election administration expenses that multiple units deploy in a given place. 
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knowledge, this methodology has never been used in this context. The 
strength of this approach is that it allows us to make novel geographic 
comparisons that inform crucial policy and doctrinal debates.  
III. MAIN FINDINGS 
The previous Part explained how we collected and analyzed data 
from hundreds of county and subcounty government units that have a 
hand in funding and running elections. This Part includes our main 
findings. We stress three points.  
First, geographic comparison in the four states we studied 
reveals massive variation between and within states in the funding of 
election services. The multiple and overlapping government layers in 
one part of a state might have many multiple times the resources of 
those in other parts of a state. Insofar as spending is associated with 
quality, a person in one part of, say Texas or California, might receive 
far more and better election services than in another part of the state. 
Funding levels, as previously noted, are not necessarily commensurate 
with the quality of election services, but of course we cannot begin to 
explore a relationship between the two without knowing how much is 
being spent.  
Second, we were unable to establish a clear connection between 
funding variation and variables like race, poverty, and education levels. 
This is perhaps our most striking finding. We expected variation in 
funding to be strongly related to known sources of electoral 
disadvantage. Instead, we find odd local idiosyncrasies to be the 
dominant feature. This complicates the conventional narrative in which 
election officials systematically underinvest in poor or minority 
communities. To be clear, such underinvestment exists in an 
unfortunate number of instances and, in many instances seems 
intentional. But our data suggests that the simplest version of the 
conventional narrative—that disadvantaged communities are always 
forced to operate with fewer resources than their peer communities—is 
perhaps oversimplified.  
Third, we find surprisingly low spending levels. While there are 
some outlier local governments that invest heavily in election 
administration, most spend very little (typically around $4.50–$8.50 
annual per capita).96 
 
 96. These findings generally align with the preliminary results reported by the UNC-
Charlotte research team. See Mohr et al., supra note 7, at 22–23. 
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A. Geographic Variation  
We begin with a geographic representation of our data, first 
focusing on municipalities, then on counties, and then tracts. The 
advantage of a geographic approach is that it locates data in real space. 
This allows us to represent a mountain of difficult data in a condensed 
format that permits readers to explore and test their intuitions.97 
Figure 1 focuses on the election expenditures of municipalities in 
California. The Census Bureau identifies more than a thousand cities, 
towns, villages, townships, and other municipalities that might have a 
hand in funding and running elections. They range from Los Angeles 
with a population of around four million to small towns with a few 
hundred residents.98 To make their average election expenditures 
comparable, we represent in Figure 1 per capita expenditures in 
different colors:99 The deeper the brown, the more local spending levels 
are below the state median; the stronger the green, the more local 
spending is above the state median. Grey indicates expenditures 
around the state median.100 Figure 1 includes both observed and 
inferred data. (Appendix 1 provides the same figure with only  
observed data.)  
 
 
 97. See Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate 
Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 196 (2019) (“Geography is information-rich, multifaceted,  
and underutilized.”). 
 98. Geographic size is, of course, not synonymous with importance and often has little 
relationship to population size.  
 99. A note to readers: In order to observe the color coding in the figures that follow, please 
access the online version of this Article on the Vanderbilt Law Review’s website, 
https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org. 
 100. Each quarter standard deviation from the state mean results in a deepening hue.  
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FIGURE 1: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA  




Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median; stronger 
greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band surrounding  
the state median. 
Figure 1 illustrates the great number of municipalities  
in California and their geographic disbursal. While big coastal  
cities and Sacramento are easy to identify, Figure 1 also shows the  
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many municipalities in the Central Valley along Highway 99 and  
Northern California. 
 The biggest lesson of Figure 1 is the great range of local election 
expenditures. Many municipalities spend less than a dollar per person 
per year on election expenditures, while others spend many multiples 
more. While the median is low, the distribution is also noticeable. Most 
municipalities spend at or below the statewide median on election 
expenditures. Yet, the relatively few municipalities that spend more, 
spend far above the average.  
The next lesson of Figure 1 is the lack of a predictable pattern. 
High election expenditure jurisdictions are distributed throughout the 
state, many in places that might be hard to predict. Conversely, 
numerous well-known and wealthy municipalities fall on the lower end 
of the expenditure spectrum. There simply is no clear pattern to the 
variation (say, a costal versus interior divide that might be suggested 
by political differences). Instead, we observed a sprinkled pattern where 
similarly situated neighbors are multiple standard deviations apart on 
election expenditures.  
These lessons hold true in the other three states where we 
collected data.  
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FIGURE 2: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA  
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN TEXAS 
 
 
Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;  
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band  
surrounding the state median. 
Figure 2 shows the geographic dispersal of municipalities in 
Texas, including a string of towns along the I-20 and I-35 corridors. 
Election expenditures, once again color coded by standard deviations 
away from the state median, vary drastically throughout the state. But 
they also vary within distinct parts of the state. For example, the 
Dallas-Fort Worth greater metropolitan area includes many cities and 
towns. Some have below average expenditures, while some neighboring 
towns are well above average. We will explore this variation in greater 
detail in the next Section. For now, we merely seek to demonstrate the 
geographic variation in election expenditures that, as Figure 3 shows, 
also holds true in Arizona and Florida. 
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FIGURE 3: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA  





Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;  
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band surrounding 
the state median. 
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The previous figures showed municipal election expenditures. 
Perhaps, one might imagine, municipalities differ in how much they 
spend on elections, but counties do not (or differ less). Perhaps in many 
places, municipalities vary more than counties, given counties’ 
governing responsibilities. To explore this possibility, Figure 4 
geographically represents the election expenditures of different 
counties. The Figure includes inferred county-level data for Texas.  
 
FIGURE 4: OBSERVED AND INFERRED  





Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;  
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a  
band surrounding the state median. 
 
Figure 4 again displays a great deal of data. Like the municipal 
figures, this Figure does not show geographic patterns along the lines 
that we expected. Instead, we observe a colorful patchwork of altering 
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election expenditures. Driving across one of these states, one could 
continuously toggle back and forth between counties that spend 
significantly below and above the state average.  
Perhaps this finding is due to a myopic misunderstanding of 
election expenditures. In many places, municipalities and counties 
work in concert to organize, run, and fund elections. For instance, it 
could be that one locale focuses its election activities at the county level, 
thereby minimizing the role that municipalities play. Alternatively, 
another locale might channel election expenditures primarily through 
cities and towns, while relegating the county government to a more 
modest role. If true, these two locales might have identical or similar 
election expenditures, rendering the previous figures misleading.  
To explore this possibility, Figure 5 aggregates and 
disaggregates county and municipal government election expenditures 
according to census tracts.101 We again begin with California. 
 
FIGURE 5: OBSERVED AND INFERRED PER CAPITA  
CENSUS TRACT EXPENDITURES IN CALIFORNIA 
 
 
Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;  
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a  
band surrounding the state median. 
 
 101. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.  
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Figure 5 provides a sense of how county and subcounty election 
expenditures interact in California. As a general matter, this Figure 
closely tracks the California county-only expenditures provided in 
Figure 4. The reason is simple: in most areas of California, county 
election expenditures dwarf subcounty expenditures (typically eight to 
one). Therefore, the impact of municipal expenditures is often modest. 
That is, municipal expenditures are rarely high enough to overcome the 
significant variation in county-to-county expenditures observed in 
Figure 4.  
Nevertheless, while limited, municipal expenditures still 
contribute to overall state heterogeneity by creating subcounty 
variation. Two voters within the same county might be differently 
situated because one receives election services only from the county 
while the other receives services from both the county and their town. 
For example, while Fresno County spends below the state average, the 
City of Fresno’s significantly above-average election expenditures bring 
the overall expenditures close to the state average. There are also 
examples of compounding effects, where low county expenditures are 
deepened by low city expenditures and, conversely, where a voter 
receives the benefit of both high city and county expenditures. 
Sometimes both effects occur side by side.  
Similar patterns to those observed in California hold true in 
Florida, Texas, and Arizona. While these are only four states, we 
speculate that other states are no different. Perhaps this is because 
states typically do not have overarching, statewide mechanisms to 
detect unequal election expenditures, let alone counteract  
them. Without more information and a normalizing mechanism, it  
is not surprising that there is massive geographic variation in  
election expenditures.  
B. Null Findings 
The geographic variation observed above demands further 
inquiry. What drives these different spending patterns? We are not 
aware of any deep theoretical accounts describing the variables that 
affect local election administration spending decisions. Therefore, we 
have little guidance to inform the construction of a causal model. That 
said, our findings suggest a complex and unexpected relationship 
between election expenditures and voter disadvantage. Countless 
reports, studies, and news pieces reveal various forms of voter 
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suppression, particularly within minority communities.102 Yet, 
surprisingly, judged only by the amount of money spent, one would not 
anticipate a greater number of voting-related problems in these 
communities. We discuss our general findings before considering 
possible explanations for this specific incongruity between our findings 
and common expectations. 
We begin our account with a simple scatterplot103 that shows the 
relationship between election expenditures in various California 
municipalities and the percentage of the municipality that is defined as 
nonwhite by the Census Bureau.104 Municipalities on the left-hand side 
are more homogenously white, while municipalities towards the right 
are less so. Observations toward the bottom indicate low-expenditure 
jurisdictions while observations higher up have higher expenditure 
levels. Figure 6 includes predicted and observed data. Observed values 
are marked by a dark border while predicted data lacks such borders. 
(Appendix 2 provides the same graph with only observed data.) 
 
 
 102. E.g., Theodore R. Johnson, The New Voter Suppression, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 
16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voter-suppression 
[https://perma.cc/A7VP-CR2L]; Michael Wines, Voting Rights Advocates Used to Have an Ally in 
the Government. That’s Changing., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/08/12/us/voting-rights-voter-id-suppression.html [https://perma.cc/X4CZ-5Y8Z]. 
 103. Michael Friendly & Daniel Denis, The Early Origins and Development of the Scatterplot, 
41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCIS. 103, 103 (2005) (“[W]e define a scatterplot as a plot of two variables, x and 
y, measured independently to produce bivariate pairs (xi, yi), and displayed as individual points on 
a coordinate grid typically defined by horizontal and vertical axes, where there is no necessary 
functional relation between x and y.”). 
 104. We recognize, of course, that the census categories are only crude proxies.  
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FIGURE 6: SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION EXPENDITURES TO  
NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes inferred observations 
(highlighted by black borders). Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure. 
The black trend line (with gray ninety-five percent confidence 
intervals) indicates the correlation between election expenditures and 
demographic diversity. It is almost entirely flat. While there is, of 
course, variation between different municipalities, that variation is not 
related in an obvious manner to demographic diversity. Figure 7 shows 
the same information for Texas. (Appendix 3 provides the same graph 
with only observed data.)  
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FIGURE 7: SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION EXPENDITURES TO  
NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES IN TEXAS 
 
Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes inferred observations 
(highlighted by black borders). Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure. 
Once again, we observe a mostly flat trend line. The same holds 
true in Arizona and Florida. Other traditional variables similarly fail 
to show dramatic trends. For example, one might expect that median 
household income is strongly correlated with election expenditures in a 
community. After all, more income means more wealth, a stronger tax 
base, and more money to spend. Yet, as Figure 8 shows, the relationship 
is again flat. 
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FIGURE 8: SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION EXPENDITURES  
TO MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes inferred observations 
(highlighted by black borders). Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure. 
These figures are suggestive, but they are, of course, grossly 
incomplete. For four states and many variables of interest, one could 
multiply these figures a hundred times over. Instead of presenting 
reams of largely duplicative figures, Figure 9 combines all four states 
and numerous variables (on a normalized scale).  
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FIGURE 9: SCATTERPLOT OF NORMALIZED VARIABLES 
 
 
Notes: Municipalities are sized by population. Includes observed and predicted 
data. Extreme outliers not shown in the Figure. 
Figure 9 once again shows flat trend lines, this time across all 
four states and across numerous variables. This is an intuitive, though 
of course also incomplete, way to summarize the data.  
A more systematic way to structure the inquiry is through 
regression analysis that includes a host of variables all at once (and, 
potentially, all four states as well). That was, indeed, our starting point. 
We intended to report the results of a series of models estimating 
observed and predicted election administration expenditures. These 
models used a variety of explanatory and control variables including 
median household income, median age, nonwhite population 
percentage, Hispanic and Latino population percentages, non-U.S. 
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citizen percentages, educational achievement measures, female-to-
male earnings ratios, employment status measures, mobility measures, 
type and extent of health care coverage measures, poverty shares, 
disability measures, and volume of government assistance recipients. 
In short, these variables represented a smorgasbord of likely variables 
that could explain community differences.  
Despite this promise, our models turned out inconclusive. Most 
commonly, the models lacked statistical or substantive significance. 
Even where that was not the case, the direction of the effects swung 
widely from one specification to the next. At this point, even if we found 
a model specification that produced intelligible, clear, and statistically 
significant coefficients, we would still be hesitant to report such a 
model, as it might simply be the result of unintentional p-hacking.  
We did not expect to find small coefficients that were barely 
statistically significant or dependent on stumbling upon a fragile model 
specification. The standard here was higher. Perhaps a model 
specification we have not tried would produce statistically significant 
coefficients, but we are not satisfied that the search for the just-so 
model would be good enough. In the end, we do not report on these 
models here because we lack confidence in them. The stakes are high, 
and the data seems insufficient to draw strong inferences.105 The clear 
implication is that our data does not allow us to claim that election 
administration expenditures are systematically related to the 
presumptive explanations of electoral disadvantage.106 
But what about minority voter disadvantage? Perhaps the most 
revealing aspect of our findings is that minority voter disadvantage is 
seemingly not related to fiscal constraints. In light of this null finding, 
what can be said about electoral marginalization? After all, it is 
indisputably the case that minorities, living and voting in minority 
communities, are often impaired by subpar election administration. The 
Leadership Conference Education Fund recently reported:   
 
 105. Of course, this is not to say that more theoretical work on causal links might not lead the 
way towards findings of clear causal effects. We strongly encourage such work. Our data and 
analysis, however, simply do not presently support such claims.  
 106. There are many other possible explanations. For example, an unobserved independent 
variable might drive election administration expenses (and also covary with a host of other 
variables). Perhaps the most likely candidate for such a variable is local party politics. We did not 
include this variable in our dataset in part because of significant theoretical and data-collection 
difficulties (e.g., it is often difficult to determine which elected and nonelected officials drive 
budgetary decisions over multiple years). That said, the UNC-Charlotte research team has 
considered this possibility in North Carolina. See Zachary Mohr, JoEllen V. Pope, Martha E. Kropf 
& Mary Jo Sheperd, Strategic Spending: Does Politics Influence Election Administration 
Expenditure?, 63 AM. J. POL. SCI. 427 (2019) (finding that political partisanship does not appear to 
influence election administration expenditures in North Carolina). 
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[A] growing number of states and localities across the country have attempted to suppress 
voter participation among Black and Brown communities in various ways. States have 
shortened voting hours and days, enacted new barriers to voter registration, purged 
millions of eligible votes from the rolls, implemented strict voter identification laws, 
reshaped voting districts, and closed polling places.107 
The incongruity between our findings and common beliefs about the 
fiscal deprivation of minority communities raises several interesting 
possibilities, all of which should form the basis for future research. 
One possibility is that our sample set does not include locations 
in which minority voter disadvantage exists. This explanation is 
unlikely, as our sample contains large, diverse cities including Houston, 
Phoenix, and Los Angeles, in which minority voters are often confronted 
with woeful election administration.108 A second possibility is that 
roughly even election expenditures across counties and census tracts 
obscure uneven needs. For example, minority populations may more 
often require certain voting services, like ballot language assistance, 
than is the case for other populations. If true, jurisdictions serving such 
populations need excess funding, and even an equitable level of funding 
would prove inadequate and result in a variety of cascading problems. 
While possible, it seems unlikely that minority voters have unique 
needs that are drastically different from others. 
Another possibility is that election laws disproportionately 
impact minority voters despite sufficient election expenditures. That is, 
perhaps the right to vote is inherently fragile, thereby elevating the 
significance of preexisting infirmities.109 Under this possibility, the 
burdens on minority voters caused by, for instance, polling place 
closures or cutbacks to early voting days, while very real, simply have 
little to do with funding. If these burdens exist independent of any  
cost concerns, a different set of non-expenditure-related reforms  
are warranted.  
 
 107. THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., 
DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE CLOSURES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 6 (2019), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Democracy-Diverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/86B3-MH7E]. 
 108. See, e.g., Alexa Ura, Harris County Clerk Apologizes to Voters, “Takes Full Responsibility” 
for Long Waits to Vote in Houston, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/06/harris-county-clerk-apologizes-long-waits-vote-houston 
[https://perma.cc/69YQ-ZWW4] (describing “excessively long lines experienced at voting sites 
serving mostly black and Hispanic communities”); Dianna M. Náñez & Agnel Philip, Maricopa 
County Residents Purged from Voter Rolls More Than 1 Million Times in Past Decade, AZCENTRAL, 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/04/minorities-poor-areas-most-
affected-maricopa-county-voter-purges/1855248002 (last updated Nov. 4, 2018, 1:47 PM) 
[https://perma.cc/2V23-LEYU] (“Purges of inactive voters in Maricopa County over the past 10 
years have disproportionately affected lower-income communities, where minorities make up a 
larger share of the population . . . .”).  
 109. See Joshua S. Sellers & Justin Weinstein-Tull, Constructing the Right to Vote, 96 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
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Finally, there is of course the possibility that our methodology 
fails to capture the relevant unit of analysis. Perhaps counties, census 
tracts, and municipalities are not where we should expect to find 
election expenditure disparities. It is possible that such disparities 
would only be revealed through more granular neighborhood 
appraisals. Unfortunately, our data does not capture that level of detail. 
We hope that others will use our data as a starting point for exploring 
these possibilities.  
C. Comparing Democracy and Burritos  
Implicit in the previous figures is a measure of how much 
municipalities and counties spend on elections. The numbers tend to be 
quite low. Of course, there are numerous outliers, but typically, a 
municipality spends only a few dollars per person on election work. 
Counties tend to spend more, but still typically spend less than the price 
of a burrito. This is a measure of absolute values. What about relative 
expenditures? Figure 10 shows absolute and relative investments in 
election administration. Each dot represents a municipality in one of 
the four states where we collected data. The vertical axis shows election 
expenditures in absolute terms. The horizontal axis shows election 
expenditures in relative terms (the percentage of the municipal budget 
devoted to election work).  
 
            
1118 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1079 
FIGURE 10: SCATTERPLOT OF MUNICIPAL ABSOLUTE AND  




As the Figure makes clear, most municipalities spend less than 
one percent of their budgets on elections.110 Many spend far less. Figure 
10 also suggests that municipalities that spend more on elections in 
absolute terms also spend more on elections in relative terms. As Figure 
11 shows, the same applies to county expenditures.  
 
 
 110. By contrast, local governments often spend around five percent of their general 
expenditures on police protection. BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON POLICE PROTECTION IN THE U.S., 2000-2017, at 1, 6 (2020), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slgeppus0017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPF4-9UDT]. 
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FIGURE 11: SCATTERPLOT OF COUNTY ABSOLUTE AND  





Most observed counties spend less than ten dollars per capita on 
elections, and very few spend more than twenty dollars per capita. 
Election administration in most counties accounts for less than one 
percent of their expenditures, though there are more outliers here than 
in Figure 10.111  
 
 111. See Auburn Professor and National Institute for Election Administration Research and 
Practice Director Comments on Election Technology in Light of Iowa Caucus Issues, AUBURN  
UNIV. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://ocm.auburn.edu/experts/2020/02/041249-iowa-caucus-issues.php 
[https://perma.cc/48WA-3F7Q] (“[O]ur study indicates that the average portion of a county budget 
spent on election operations is about 0.5 percent—more or less in some places of course, but likely 
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IV. REIMAGINING DOCTRINE 
Overall, one of the animating purposes of this project is to 
inspire further thinking about the relationship between election 
expenditures and election law doctrines. How might expenditure data 
be relevant in election law litigation? This Part responds to the findings 
and explores potential doctrines under which election expenditures 
might be considered. 
A clarifying point at the outset: our data collection was focused 
on inputs. Given the consistently expressed need by election 
administrators for more money, we wanted to uncover how much money 
is being spent, on average, and whether any identifiable spending 
patterns exist. As noted above, we largely found election expenditures 
to be idiosyncratic. This general finding renders inapposite many of the 
most common election law claims. Absent evidence of spending 
disparities between majority-minority and majority-white 
communities, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which forbids any 
“standard, practice, or procedure . . . which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color,”112 is unviable. Likewise, with no evidence of 
the intentional deprivation of election expenditures to select 
communities, Fourteenth Amendment claims based on intentional 
discrimination are rendered moot.  
The larger point is that any viable legal claim premised on 
unequal or inadequate election expenditures rests on the ability to show 
a demonstrable link between spending (inputs) and the quality of 
election administration (outputs). Our data is focused only on the 
former. Consequently, the legal analysis that follows is speculative. We 
wish there were a data repository tracking election performance at the 
local level—something akin to what the MIT Election Data and Science 
Lab provides for the state level.113 If so, we could easily compare our 
data against various indicators of election administration and highlight 
where poor election administration corresponds to low spending.  
But that is currently not possible. Presuming possession of the relevant 
information, however, we believe the doctrines discussed below  
are germane. 
 
less than 1 percent most everywhere. That is not a lot of investment for the government function 
that undergirds  
our democracy.”). 
 112. 52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
 113. Election Performance Index: Indicators, MIT ELECTION DATA & SCI. LAB., https:// 
elections.mit.edu/#/data/indicators (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/NBG7-XRV]. 
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A. Bush v. Gore as Precedent 
Section I.C briefly introduced the possibility of relying on Bush 
v. Gore as a basis for challenging the differential treatment of voters.114 
Recall that the case suggested that “arbitrary and disparate treatment” 
of voters by a state is unconstitutional.115 Also recall that the import 
given to this pronouncement is widely contested, with some arguing 
that it applies, if at all, only to circumstances nearly indistinguishable 
from those of the case, and others arguing that it introduced a new legal 
basis to contest differential voter treatment more broadly. A thorough 
summary of the debate is outside the scope of this Article, but, in his 
comprehensive analysis of Bush v. Gore’s jurisprudential legacy, 
Michael Morley concludes that the decision’s “Uniformity Principle,”116 
the principle mandating the uniform treatment of voters, “has evolved 
into a fully enforceable, generally applicable election-law doctrine.”117 
In short, it is plausible that Bush v. Gore can be relied on to challenge 
intercounty disparities in election expenditures when such disparities 
are found to meaningfully influence voter services. 
Consider the following scenario. Imagine a county, flush with 
cash, in which county election officials decide to adopt a state-of-the-art 
voting machine. The machine is easy to use, efficient, virtually 
unhackable, and records votes in both electronic and paper forms. 
Further, the county can afford to pay a large number of election staffers 
to guide voters through the process of using the machine without 
difficulty. Voters in the county universally laud the voting process, and 
voter error rates are nonexistent.  
Now assume the neighboring county, which is demographically 
indistinguishable and of similar size, is cash strapped. Its voters cast 
their ballots on decades-old electronic voting machines that are 
challenging to operate, highly vulnerable to cyberattack, and do not 
provide a paper trail. Polling place assistance exists, but is minimal, 
and voters routinely leave the polling site unsure if their preferences 
were accurately recorded. Error rates exceed those found elsewhere in 
the state. Voters in the county detest the voting process and many have 
withdrawn from participation due to frustration. Are these voters 
simply out of luck? 
 
 114. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); supra Section I.C. 
 115. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05.  
 116. Michael T. Morley, Bush v. Gore’s Uniformity Principle and the Equal Protection of the 
Right to Vote, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 229, 231 (2020).  
 117. Id. at 233. 
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This scenario provides an example of when a Bush v. Gore-style 
challenge based around disparate resources might be sensible.118 Voters 
in the county with the outdated voting machines should have standing 
to challenge the comparative financial inadequacy of their election 
system. Of course, and to reiterate, any allegations based on such 
intercounty disparities would need to be tethered to actual voting 
problems.119 And it would be necessary to trace the funding disparity to 
a decision made by state or local officials.120 Thorny questions will 
undoubtedly arise about administrative costs, funding streams, and 
unfulfilled obligations.121 But, where record evidence establishes a link 
between election expenditures and electoral disadvantage, we believe 
Bush v. Gore should serve as a precedent on which litigants can rely. 
Perhaps a challenge could be structured around findings of the 
sort we provide in this Article—per capita election funding. As noted in 
Part II, our findings are most probative when used to compare 
neighboring or similarly situated counties. It is worth repeating that 
complete equality in election spending is both implausible and unwise; 
it fails to capture local idiosyncrasies. When jurisdictions can be fairly 
compared, however, the Equal Protection Clause might be interpreted 
to require substantial equality of election services across counties 
within each state. Thus, when a cash-strapped county with limited 
polling sites has substantially higher voter wait times than like 
counties in the state, such a disparity would be actionable. A claim of 
this sort is most promising where state (opposed to local) officials 
largely oversee and finance elections and where funding and budgetary 
decisions can be scrutinized. 
Incidentally, plaintiffs who challenged Georgia’s election system 
in 2019 made a version of this claim. As background, the 2018 election 
in Georgia—in which nearly four million votes were cast—was centered 
around the gubernatorial election between Secretary of State Brian 
Kemp and former minority leader in the Georgia House of 
Representatives Stacey Abrams. Following Kemp’s election, Abrams 
 
 118. See Hasen, supra note 55, at 206 (“[I]f county discretion leads to significantly greater 
opportunities to vote for voters in some counties rather than others, an equal protection claim 
seems plausible.”). 
 119. See Morley, supra note 116, at 262 (“Courts have also invalidated substantial variations 
among localities’ election procedures or resources that led to disparities in voting opportunities.”). 
 120. See generally Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1035 (2007) (providing a useful taxonomy of hypothetical Bush v. Gore-type claims). Foley exhibits 
skepticism of at least one version of the claim we endorse. Id. at 1047 (“A local ballot shortage 
caused by the locality’s mistaken interpretation of a statewide mandate would obviously be much 
less easy to justify than a local ballot shortage caused by a deliberate, budget-cutting decision 
pursuant to express legislative authority to make this local policy choice.”). 
 121. See Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1395–96; Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra  
note 109. 
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formed an organization—Fair Fight Action—that challenged multiple 
aspects of Georgia’s election system.122   
The organization’s amended complaint contains a wide variety 
of claims, including one alleging that “Georgia’s voting system [ ] 
violates Equal Protection because voters are subject to arbitrary and 
inconsistent differences in rules, processes, and burdens depending on 
where voters happen to reside.”123 By “abdicating their responsibilities 
under state law,”124 the complaint argues, state officials “have allowed 
the voting processes in the 159 counties in Georgia to devolve into an 
arbitrary and inconsistent web of actual laws, erroneous 
interpretations of laws, and local rules that are often unannounced 
until applied to a voter. These inconsistent, nonuniform rules subject 
voters to unequal voting strength.”125 Citing Bush v. Gore, the 
complaint accuses state officials of turning a blind eye to shortcomings 
within certain local election systems and to the differential allocation of 
resources across counties.126 The type of data we provide offers, at a 
minimum, a useful supplement to claims of this sort. 
Finally, the plausibility of a claim rooted in Bush v. Gore, or the 
Equal Protection Clause generally, is strengthened by the 
categorization of the right to vote as a fundamental right.127 
Unconstitutional abridgment or deprivation of the right to vote need 
not occur through express prohibition or restraint; government failure 
to facilitate the right to vote is also constitutionally problematic. Put 
differently, guaranteeing the right to vote, yet failing to finance the 
necessary apparatus for voters to effectively exercise that right, is 
unconstitutional (in)activity.128 In sum, election expenditure data 
permits intercounty comparisons that enhance litigants’ claims to 
equality in the distribution of election services.     
 
 122. See Jelani Cobb, Stacey Abrams’s Fight for a Fair Vote, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/19/stacey-abrams-fight-for-a-fair-vote 
[https://perma.cc/32WF-9MTP]. The litigation was initially entitled Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. 
Raffensperger. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, No. 18-cv-
05391 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2019), ECF No. 159-1. Fair Fight Action, Inc. has since dropped out of 
the litigation, which is now entitled Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta v. Raffensperger.  
 123. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 72, Fair Fight Action, Inc. 
v. Raffensperger, No. 18-cv-05391 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2019), ECF No. 41. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 72–73. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–67 (1966). 
 128. See Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109. 
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B. Electoral Adequacy 
As emphasized throughout this Article, the absence of election 
expenditure data stifles reform efforts. Data along the lines of what we 
provide here introduces the possibility of a legal claim premised on the 
notion of electoral adequacy. The notion of adequacy in the electoral 
context is conceptually tricky, yet it avoids the challenges presented by 
equality arguments. Moreover, the concept of adequacy has been 
helpfully explicated in the context of education reform litigation.129  
As background, advocates for educational equity initially 
brought claims seeking equal, or roughly equal, educational spending 
per pupil.130 That strategy shifted in 1989 at the start of what is 
conventionally known as the “third wave” of education litigation,131 
after which plaintiffs sought not equality per se, but instead, a minimal, 
or adequate, level of educational services to which children are entitled. 
As summarized by Richard Briffault,  
Under the adequacy theory, the constitutional violation is not that school districts depend 
on drastically unequal property tax bases or that per pupil expenditures vary across 
districts largely according to local wealth, but that the state government has failed to 
assure that all public school children in the state are receiving an adequate education.132 
The success of the shift towards educational adequacy—one 
study puts litigants’ success rate at sixty percent—turned on the 
general amenability of state officials to educational standards,133 as 
well as judges’ willingness to creatively utilize their  
remedial authority.134 How might these lessons be applied in the 
electoral context? 
 
 129. For a fuller examination of the concept of adequacy in the educational and election 
litigation contexts, see id. 
 130. William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of 
Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1901 (2017) (“Although early litigation 
focused on the development of the right to equal per-pupil funding, or at least a school finance 
scheme not dependent upon local property wealth, more recent litigation has sought to define 
qualitatively the substantive education to which children are constitutionally entitled.”);  
Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal, 16 Q.J. ECON. 1189,  
1189–92 (2001). 
 131. Koski, supra note 130, at 1904. 
 132. Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity: The Evolving Legal Theory of School 
Finance Reform 1–2 (Columbia L. Sch. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 06-111; Princeton L. & 
Pub. Affs. Working Paper, Paper No. 06-013, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=906145 [https://perma.cc/ZRE5-VU8W]; see Koski, supra note 130, at 1904 (“An 
adequate education is understood to mean a specific qualitative level of educational resources or, 
focusing on outcomes, a specific level of resources required to achieve certain educational outcomes 
based on external and fixed standards.”).  
 133. Koski, supra note 130, at 1906. 
 134. Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A 
New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1631–
32 (2018). 
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For one, serious theoretical work needs to be done regarding 
what a baseline level of election services should entail. In the 
educational context, policymakers and judges made precise 
determinations about everything from library holdings to the number 
of calculators needed in a trigonometry class.135 We need similar, deep 
thinking about election administration analogues.136 
Second, we need more reliable data about election spending. As 
is true for all rights, at some point, fiscal considerations must be 
broached, as appropriations choices are inevitably informed by 
available funds. Education reformers have the benefit of transparency 
when it comes to educational spending. Until we have a better sense of 
what is currently being spent in the election context, pragmatic 
recommendations remain challenging. 
Third, reformers need to construct viable legal theories in 
support of the notion of electoral adequacy. School finance plaintiffs 
evolved their theories from equity, to adequacy, and beyond.137 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that inequitably 
funded school districts violate the Equal Protection Clause,138 legal 
challenges are now typically brought under state constitutions. State 
constitutions also provide a promising, though completely undeveloped, 
avenue for electoral adequacy claims.  
Josh Douglas identifies several states with constitutions in 
which elections are guaranteed to be either “free and open” or “free and 
equal.”139 These provisions provide a textual hook on which electoral 
adequacy claims might be brought, a textual hook that is not 
qualitatively different than the state constitutional provisions 
promising “thorough and efficient” or “general and uniform” 
educational systems. A successful electoral adequacy claim might order  
state legislatures to clarify the maximum amount of time that voters should wait in line 
to vote, how many voting machines per capita each jurisdiction is required to maintain, 
how poll workers are to be trained, or how much money each jurisdiction is to receive from 
the state for election technology.140 
In sum, electoral adequacy warrants further analysis. 
 
 135. Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See generally Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School 
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195 (2011) (discussing the traditional legal theories and 
arguing for a new approach, the “broken system theory”). 
 138. 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973). 
 139. Douglas, supra note 67, at 144–49. 
 140. Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109. 
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C. Broadening the Balancing Test 
In addition to challenges based on Bush v. Gore or state 
constitutions, the aforementioned Anderson-Burdick standard of 
review might be expanded to account for inadequate election 
expenditures. We refer to “expanding” or “broadening” the balancing 
test simply because, to date, assessments of election administration 
resources have not meaningfully factored into the doctrine. Recall that 
Anderson-Burdick balances burdens on voters against state interests.141 
If a state or county enacts a severe burden on the right to vote, that 
restriction will be subject to strict scrutiny.142 By contrast, if the 
restriction is “evenhanded” and “protect[s] the integrity and reliability 
of the electoral process,”143 courts balance the burden on the voter 
“against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications 
for the burden imposed by its rule.’ ”144   
It is uncommon for courts to find that government regulations 
constitute severe burdens on voters. That said, Anderson-Burdick 
introduced a self-consciously “flexible standard” that might have 
traction here.145 Take the earlier example about voting machines. 
Voters in the impoverished county are arguably subjected to an 
impermissible burden on their right to vote: their voting experience is 
laborious, and most notably, the sanctity of their votes is shaky, given 
the vulnerability of the voting machines and the lack of a paper trail. 
The reason the county has not upgraded its machines is because it 
cannot afford to do so. Under Anderson-Burdick, state and local 
governments should, we believe, be subjected to exacting scrutiny that 
requires an explanation as to why their elections are inadequately 
funded. This is essentially another type of electoral adequacy claim, as 
outlined in the previous Section.  
Many questions might be raised about the county’s fiscal 
decisions under the balancing test. Sticking with the example, what 
interests can the county advance in defense of its use of a problematic 
voting machine? Are fiscal constraints alone sufficient to justify the 
county’s choice to maintain the status quo? To take another example, 
could a county close a large number of polling sites in the interest of, 
say, balancing its budget? And when would voters have a right of action 
against the state in response to such closures? 
 
 141. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 142. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008). 
 143. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). 
 144. Id. at 190 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
 145. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
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These are difficult questions that we hope to tackle in depth in 
future work. For now, we simply suggest that litigants supplement 
traditional legal theories with claims regarding election expenditures. 
Whether under Bush v. Gore, state constitutions, or Anderson-Burdick, 
we believe there is doctrinal space for novel arguments along  
these lines. 
D. Race to the Top?      
One of the fundamental difficulties in answering the questions 
presented above is the absence of an agreement about what a baseline 
level of voting services entails. How long is too long to wait in line at a 
polling site? Is a paper trail for an electronic voting machine essential? 
How many early voting days, if any, should be provided? Fundamental 
differences of opinion over these issues are widespread.  
If, as posited above, election law doctrines begin to account for 
intercounty disparities in election expenditures that relate to voting 
irregularities or inequalities, would this effectively require a statewide 
leveling up of election services? Put differently, do intercounty 
comparisons necessitate equality of services? We do not think so. For 
one, there are many reasons to favor local experimentation in the realm 
of election administration.146 We should encourage creative efforts to 
expedite the voting experience, increase the number of available voting 
days, and expand the electorate to nonvoting populations.  
Election administration is not an area where a one-size-fits-all 
approach is sensible, and a simplistic emphasis on costs alone elides  
this complexity.  
Second, we should remain sensitive to the possibility that there 
is waste and inefficiency within the election system that can be 
eliminated without compromising electoral equity. The elimination of 
such waste could result in lowering election expenditures. Simply 
because one county or city makes such changes should not bring that 
 
 146. Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1400–02; see Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of 
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954, 975 (2019):  
Local governments, the argument goes, serve as critical sites for democratic 
participation and local political engagement. Local participation reinforces bedrock 
public values as people learn to cooperate to solve problems that face much more 
significant collective-action challenges at larger scales. As a result, local governments 
have a distinctive capacity to reflect community needs in polities that foster local voice; 
Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1233 (2018) (“City 
power is necessary to vindicate the values of diversity, majority rule, and local self-government.”); 
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term — Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2010) (“[S]ome think that localities represent better sites for pursuing 
federalism’s values because they are closer to the people, offer more realistic options for voting 
with one’s feet, and map more closely onto communities of interest.”).   
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jurisdiction under scrutiny merely because it spends less on elections 
than a comparable jurisdiction. Again, to the extent that election 
expenditures are legally relevant, it is because of their relationship to 
inadequate voter services.  
In short, even under the doctrinal possibilities explored above, 
we do not endorse a legal requirement mandating that all counties 
within a state emulate the single county that seemingly runs elections 
the best. That said, we reiterate our belief that policymakers, judges, 
and other experts should create standards for assessing election 
administration performance.147 These standards should, in our view, 
exceed the current legal floor that prohibits only outright 
discrimination or manifest injustices.148 
All of this heightens the urgency and importance of gathering 
more data to further explore the currently obscure relationship between 
election expenditures and election services. With that data, the 
likelihood of doctrinal evolution premised on disparate election 
expenditures will increase.149 
V. OTHER REFORM PROPOSALS 
This Part very briefly weighs the pros and cons of several 
nondoctrinal proposals for election administration reform. Overall, we 
believe that more money should be spent on election administration.  
In what follows, we explore several policy proposals pertaining  
to election funding. Importantly, most of these proposals are not 
mutually exclusive. 
A. Direct Aid 
Sometimes the most obvious solution is the best one: perhaps we 
should just give more money to counties and cities to administer 
elections. Certainly, plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that local 
officials feel resource deprived. Direct aid is most sensible when 
administered as part of an aid formula.150 Unconditional direct aid  
 
 147. Sellers & Weinstein-Tull, supra note 109.  
 148. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (noting that only “severe” restrictions on voting rights 
receive the highest level of legal scrutiny). 
 149. In addition, as noted above, more data demonstrating similar expenditures across 
counties will allow for the rejection of insincere claims by county and city governments that their 
inability to meet a minimum standard of election services is funding related.  
 150. See Bo Zhao & Katharine Bradbury, Designing State Aid Formulas, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 278, 279 (2009) (“A large portion of state aid is distributed through formulas, some of 
which allocate categorical grants for specific programs, some of which provide unconditional lump-
sum grants aimed at general fiscal equalization, and many of which fall somewhere in between.”). 
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that affords local governments complete discretion is inadvisable in  
this context.151   
Aid that is tethered to local needs provides the best chance at 
electoral equity.152 As discussed in the previous Part, the absence of 
standards for assessing election administration performance 
complicates our ability to make suggestions that are overly categorical. 
We are confident, however, in claiming that many local governments 
are currently under resourced and that state governments (and ideally 
the federal government) should provide additional funds in support of 
increased and improved election services.153 
B. Mandated Spending Levels 
Though direct aid tied to a well-crafted aid formula may be the 
best solution, there are several alternatives worth considering. One 
alternative involves states mandating certain spending levels by local 
governments. This would, at first glance, seem to accomplish the same 
leveling up as direct aid (with conditions), yet would preserve a greater 
degree of local control. 
The drawback to this suggested solution is the potential 
discordance between spending levels and the quality of election 
services. Simply mandating spending levels does nothing to ensure that 
local governments use their resources wisely. County officials might 
invest in robust cybersecurity measures while failing to pay for a 
sufficient number of polling sites. Moreover, the prophylactic nature of 
this reform does not account for local tailoring. As noted above, 
spending levels, while probative—particularly when they are woefully 
low—do not tell a complete story. It would be foolish to mandate 
increased spending levels in a jurisdiction that currently excels at 
election administration. 
Finally, for financially struggling jurisdictions, this proposal 
would require redirecting sparse resources away from other 
underfunded responsibilities, including public schools and public 
 
 151. At least until a threshold of electoral equality is achieved. 
 152. See COMM. ON NAT’L STAT., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STATISTICAL 
ISSUES IN ALLOCATING FUNDS BY FORMULA 21–22 (Thomas A. Louis, Thomas B. Jabine & Marisa 
A. Gerstein eds., 2003) (describing how aid programs can encourage spending on certain  
local services).  
 153. Essentially, we are advocating for “categorical equity” in elections. See Helen F. Ladd & 
John Yinger, The Case for Equalizing Aid, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 211, 212 (1994) (“The most fundamental 
equity argument for equalizing aid is categorical equity, which exists when all citizens have fair 
access to public services that are thought to be particularly important to their opportunities  
in life.”).   
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benefits programs. On balance, we do not find this particular reform to 
be promising.  
C. Nonlocal Election Administration   
Greater state involvement in and oversight of elections are 
additional commonly proposed solutions to electoral dysfunction.154 
Legally, local governments lack sovereignty and, as such, enjoy no 
inviolable protection against state intrusion.155 Even local governments 
that have been afforded “home rule” are not fully protected from state 
preemption.156 Consequently, if a state chooses to completely run 
elections on its own, without local government involvement, the state’s 
decision would, in most instances, be sound. 
On the other hand, states have come to rely on local 
governments to administer elections and, for the most part, have no 
vested interest in the outcome of minor local elections.157 In addition, 
complete state-level management of elections would conceivably cost 
the state a significant sum, perhaps more than states would prefer to 
pay; at a minimum, a reallocation of state/local funds would be required. 
Relatedly, state management would require assembling a team of 
officials to oversee election administration.  
Nevertheless, this is a potentially promising reform effort. The 
United States is an outlier in the way it manages elections. Most of the 
world has moved towards centralization, sometimes partisan, 
sometimes not.158 Our highly decentralized process, while justifiably 
protective of innovation, contains inefficiencies that could be mitigated 
through greater state consolidation and control.159 
 
 154. Greater federal involvement is less commonly endorsed due to both political and 
constitutional constraints. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof . . . .”). That said, political constraints aside, Congress possesses expansive 
authority to regulate “most electoral levels and topics.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Sweep of 
the Electoral Power, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 62), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3715826 [https://perma.cc/8BLL-3978].   
 155. Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1371–74; Richard C. Schragger, The Political 
Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 115–17 (2017).  
 156. Sellers & Scharff, supra note 73, at 1373. 
 157. For a detailed overview and analysis of state preemption in the electoral context, see id. 
 158. Daniel P. Tokaji, Comparative Election Administration: A Legal Perspective on Electoral 
Institutions, in COMPARATIVE ELECTION LAW (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7–8), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3500868 [https://perma.cc/D4P6-GRAT]. 
 159. See generally ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN 
SUFFRAGE (2009) (describing the impact of local variation on voting practices in the United States). 
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D. Forced Consolidation and Soft Consolidation 
A final possibility involves the forced consolidation of multiple 
small communities into mega-election-administration districts. Such 
districts could then allocate funding among localities. School districts 
often do just that; they combine multiple towns, townships, villages, 
cities, and unincorporated areas into one big district that then 
redistributes resources and sets policies among schools. The analogy to 
schools is telling because history suggests massive resistance to such 
efforts (e.g., busing schemes to integrate schools). Potentially, there 
would be significant local resistance to forced consolidation schemes in 
this context as well. 
But election administration and schooling are also not analogous 
in important ways. Perhaps most centrally, election administration 
typically does not create the same visceral responses as questions of 
where one’s children will spend a good chunk of each day. Also, as 
Section III.C showed, most communities devote less than one percent of 
their budget to election administration tasks. Education, by contrast, 
takes up a sizable chunk of local budgets.160 Equalizing election 
administration funding would thus be a smaller task (compared to 
overall expenditures) than equalizing education funding.  
Perhaps the bigger roadblock to forced consolidation schemes is 
geographical in nature: well-funded electoral jurisdictions are often not 
adjacent to their poorer neighbors. A geographically contiguous mega-
election-district is only sometimes possible. The best hope for this 
proposal is to shift more and more responsibilities from municipalities 
to counties that can then equalize resources. In states with few and 
similarly situated counties, this could go a long way towards equalizing 
election funding. But in states with many counties that are not 
similarly situated (e.g., Texas), shifting more power towards counties 
will do little to equalize resources for the bulk of the population. In these 
locations, nonlocal election consolidation is preferable. 
Beyond forced consolidation is the possibility of soft 
consolidation, where municipalities retain their separate 
administrations and responsibilities, but states create structures 
designed to scale solutions cheaply and efficiently. For example, a state 
might create a nonobligatory program to purchase technology where 
 
 160. See Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures, URB. INST., 
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-
initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/elementary-and-secondary-education-expenditures# 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DDL6-5V2H] (“In 2017, state and local governments 
spent $660 billion, or more than one-fifth (21 percent) of direct general spending, on elementary 
and secondary education.”). 
            
1132 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1079 
municipalities can freely opt in. This proposal would protect local 
control and local agency while leveraging economies of scale. If a 
sufficient number of such programs exist, and a sufficient number of 
municipalities decide to opt in, this would create a quasi-consolidated 
election district. 
CONCLUSION 
This project only scratches the surface of what remains to be 
discovered about election expenditures. Nevertheless, this Article has 
highlighted both how little money is spent on protecting and preserving 
our most fundamental right—the right to vote—and how much 
spending variance exists between cities and counties, even those that 
border one another. The latter revelation introduces a multitude of 
fruitful lines of inquiry for scholars to pursue. 
Beyond the data collection, though, we also offered preliminary 
thoughts on how our data implicates doctrinal and policy issues 
pertaining to election administration. Despite its significance, election 
funding does not meaningfully factor into existing election law 
doctrines or remedies. We suspect this is due to a lack of data and the 
enormous complexity associated with “following the money” in our 
highly decentralized election system. Yet, when financial shortfalls are 
the cause of electoral disadvantage, perhaps litigants should more 
forcefully draw out the connections between those disadvantages and 
identifiable resource disparities. Perhaps democracy on a shoestring is 
only a partial democracy at best.  
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1 
FIGURE 1 (ALTERNATE): OBSERVED PER CAPITA  
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN CALIFORNIA 
 
 
Notes: Deepening browns indicate expenditures below state median;  
stronger greens indicate above state median; grey indicates a band surrounding 
the state median. 
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APPENDIX 2 
FIGURE 6 (ALTERNATE): SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION  
EXPENDITURES TO NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR  
MUNICIPALITIES IN CALIFORNIA – OBSERVED ONLY 
 
 
Notes: Municipalities are sized by population.  
Extreme outliers removed from Figure. 
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APPENDIX 3 
FIGURE 7 (ALTERNATE): SCATTERPLOT OF ELECTION  
EXPENDITURES TO NON-WHITE POPULATION FOR  
MUNICIPALITIES IN TEXAS – OBSERVED ONLY 
 
 
Notes: Municipalities are sized by population.  
Extreme outliers removed from Figure. 
